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Abstract 
In the summer of 2009, Tampa General care providers met with Hospital 
Administration to express concern that violence on care units was a growing problem and 
making it difficult to provide quality care.  Nurses stated that such violence was one 
important reason many of their peers choose to retire.  Administration took this situation 
seriously and formed a committee to gather information and submit suggestions to reduce 
the violence.  The committee consisted of representatives from several nursing units, 
human resources, risk management, security, and administration.  Duties assigned 
included investigation of the actual number of reports on all units and trends.  The 
committee was also charged with the production of a report regarding reviewing other 
hospital data, literature review, and developing recommendations.   
Internal reports indicated that the total prevalence of reported violence as well as 
the incidence per patient had increased annually since 2005.  The hospital reports 
contradicted the national literature regarding the emergency department (ED) and 
psychiatric unit (Psych) being the two hospital units with the highest number of violent 
events.  One possible reason for the difference is that these departments require all care 
providers to attend de-escalation and self-defense classes annually.  Based on these 
findings, the researcher developed and adapted training similar to that of the ED for other 
units reporting aggressive, abusive, and violent patients.  The committee approved a draft 
plan for implementation.  Following presentation to Nursing Administration, some 
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modifications were made, and the Internal Review Boards of the hospital and University 
of South Florida (USF) approved the project.  
The hypothesis tested in this study was whether training in de-escalation and self-
defense modifies providers’ behaviors to prevent or reduce aggressive, abusive, or violent 
behavior by patients and visitors.  The independent variable was training. The dependent 
variable was requests for assistance with unruly, angry, or violent patients or visitors.  
Event reports of the year prior were used for historical comparison.  Event reports for the 
experimental period were assembled subsequent to the training for comparison.  
Nursing Administration selected two units to receive the training intervention.  
The two units selected were neither the worst nor the best in numbers, but rather the 
middle.  Nursing required that all training be scheduled in normal department meetings 
and that Nurse Managers of the units agree to participate. The research design presumed 
that at least 85% of care providers on a unit would attend the training.  Schedules were 
developed to accommodate all care providers. The training was presented during June of 
2010.     
Experimental and comparison units were monitored each month for the number of 
reported violent events (Code Grays) on each unit.  During the fourth months of 
monitoring, there was a data spike in the Cardiac Care unit.  No action was taken until 
another spike occurred during the sixth month.  It was determined that an error had 
occurred that partially invalidated the data from the Cardiac Care unit: the 85% 
participation rate among staff had not been reached.  Monitoring continued for 12 months 
after the training. The Eldercare unit showed reduced requests for assistance.  Overall, the 
Cardiac Care unit increased requests for assistance from the year before.  Results were 
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adjusted for patient census.  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Testing was performed and 
displayed using box plots to show how far the median changed during the research from 
one group to the next.  The analysis compared prior year with the year following the 
interventions, and indicated that there was a movement toward a reduction of Code 
Grays.  To determine if there was a difference between comparison units and 
experimental units 12 months after the training, Poisson Regression Analysis was 
utilized.  When the comparison units were set as the reference, Poisson analysis indicated 
the events were decreasing on both units.  The Cardiac Care unit did not have a 
statistically significant p value.  The Eldercare unit had a p value of .019.   
In conclusion, the results are mixed and statistically inconclusive. From the care 
providers’ perspective, any reduction in violence is significant.  The data regarding the 
training interventions indicates that there was an empirical, albeit not a statistically 
significant, change in Code Gray reports.  Training may have reduced the violence on the 
Eldercare unit by nearly half.
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Chapter1:  Introduction 
Several respected Nursing leaders met with Tampa General Hospital (TGH) 
Administration in June of 2009 to express concern that violence on patient care units was 
a growing problem.  They believed that violence was increasing and making it difficult to 
provide quality care.  Nurses stated that such violence had been one reason contributing 
to retirement of peers.  Administration took this situation seriously and decided to form a 
committee to gather information and submit suggestions to reduce the violence.  The 
researcher suggested the development of training similar to what had seemed to be 
effective in the emergency department.  The suggestion was approved as a trial study to 
determine the effectiveness of de-escalation and self-defense training on reducing abuse, 
aggression and violence on patient care units.   
Tampa General Hospital Information 
 
Figure 1 - Tampa General Hospital 
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TGH has a zero tolerance policy for violence.  Security is expected and monitored 
to be on scene of a violent or potentially violent situation in less than two minutes.  
Charge nurses and the emergency department historically attend a 60-minute de-
escalation and hands-on self-defense training.  This training includes how security should 
respond and how administration supports them.  None of these factors changed before, 
during, or after this research.  All of these practices have been part of the philosophy of 
TGH since 2005 and are still in place.  
The following facts about TGH may influence the number and severity of violent 
events that occur. Tampa General Hospital is:    
• A 1051 bed acute care hospital—the number of patients and visitors in 
such a large hospital increases the random chance of violence 
• A level 1 trauma center—criticality of patients and its emotional impact 
could increase number and severity of violence  
• The primary teaching hospital for the University of South Florida, College 
of Medicine—residents learning how to approach difficult patients could 
increase number and severity of violence 
• The region’s only Burn Center—patients and families are similar to 
trauma patients in criticality 
• An adult Solid Organ Transplant Center—life and death decisions on 
transplant recipients could increase violence 
• The Provider of Inpatient Specialized Rehabilitation Services—frustration 
from heightened expectations and difficulty of rehabilitation may 
contribute to violence 
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Administration was presented with a literature review to aid its decision to 
implement the trial study.  The literature reports included  a 2009 study from The Journal 
of Nursing Administration, which found that over the preceding three years, 50 percent of 
Emergency Department nurses experienced some type of physical violence – such as 
being shoved, hit, kicked  and  spat upon - and 70 percent experienced verbal abuse. 
Also, in 2001, the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that 48 
percent of all non-fatal injuries from occupational assaults and violent acts occurring in 
the United States occurred in health care and social services settings.  This report stated 
that health care workers are at a higher risk of violence than workers in any other 
employment sector, indicating the seriousness and severity of such violence.  A quotation 
from the Journal of Advanced Nursing stated:  “Violence has a detrimental effect on 
nurses’ psychological, cognitive, emotional, behavioural and spiritual well-being and a 
negative impact on public healthcare costs and organizational effectiveness.”  (Lyneham, 
2000: Mayhew & Chappell, 2001)  Consequences of violence on a hospital unit not only 
affect nurses but also reduce all care providers' effectiveness and harm patient care.  
(Henderson 2003, 1).  The alarming trend is that violence is most often committed by 
patients (Findorff, McGovern, Wall, Gerberich,& Alexander, 2008).   
Violence as a Public Health Issue 
 
The Surgeon General’s Healthy People Report in 1979 included the first public 
United States governmental recognition that violence was a Public Health issue.  
Previously, violence had only been addressed as a criminal, psychological, 
anthropological or sociological problem.  In response, the Department of Health and 
Human Services established goals for violence prevention and included them in their 
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report, Promoting Health/Preventing Disease:  Objectives for a Nation.  In 1983, the 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) began epidemiological studies and 
established the Violence Epidemiology Branch.  Subsequently, C. Everett Koop’s 
"Workshop on Violence and Public Health" emphasized the importance of public health 
professions' involvement in prevention of violence.  By 2000, a new Healthy People 
report by the Surgeon General listed violence and abusive behavior as one of 22 top 
public health priorities and called for “cooperation and integration across public health, 
health care, mental health, criminal justice, social service, education and other relevant 
sectors.” The CDC then established the Division of Injury Epidemiology and Control for 
Violence.     
Violence as a public health issue has many manifestations.  The CDC's recent 
document, “A Timeline of Violence as a Public Health Issue,” specifies that issues of 
suicide, interpersonal violence, youth violence, intimate partner violence, violence 
against women, child maltreatment and dating abuse are all issues of public health.   The 
CDC is addressing these issues by having established the Violence Epidemiology Branch 
and a new Division of Violence Prevention, having acquired funding for youth and 
intimate partner violence, violence against women and child maltreatment prevention, 
and having developed programs for suicide and interpersonal violence.  Their 
publication, VIOLENCE, Occupational Hazards in Hospitals, recognizes negative 
impacts such as low worker morale, heightened job stress, increased employee turnover, 
and reduced trust of management, coworkers, and hostility in the work environment.   
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Violence as a Hospital Issue 
One common element of most violence is that all seriously injured victims end up 
in the hospital.  Victims’ injuries and emotions, as well as possibly associated situational 
threats, become part of the hospital occupational environment. Acknowledgement of such 
potential for problems mandates that hospitals plan and implement mitigation along with 
control and response procedures (Johnson, 2006, 100). 
The magnitude and scope of violence in hospitals, particularly in emergency 
departments, is illustrated by a study conducted by the Emergency Nurses Association 
between May 2009 and February 2010.  Titled "Emergency Department Violence 
Surveillance Study," this endeavor reported the following data about hospital violence:  
Table 1.1:  Results from Emergency Department Violence Study  
Questions Percentage of Staff in agreement 
Violence perpetrated by patients and their relatives 97.1 
 Violence occurred in patient rooms 80.6 
Violence occurred in corridors, hallways and elevators 23.2 
Violence occurred at nurses’ stations 14.7 
Violence was against emergency nurses while they 
were triaging a patient 
38.2 
Occurred while restraining or subduing a patient 33.8 
Occurred while performing invasive procedures 30.9 
Male nurses reported being victims 15 
Female nurses reported being victims 10.3 
Violence occurred in large urban areas 13.4 
Violence occurred in rural areas 8.3 
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As early as 2007, Donna Mason, then President of the Emergency Nurses 
Association (ENA), foresaw the critical nature of violence in healthcare and dedicated 
her term in office to reducing it. She advocated political activity by the ENA at the state 
level to increase awareness and seek tougher legislation for emergency departments and 
healthcare employees, with the intention to improve the working environment for all 
nurses. (Mercer Ray, 2007)   
International Hospital Violence 
 
Hospital violence is not limited to the United States.  During a recent 12-month 
period, a Swiss study revealed that 72 percent of nurses had experienced verbal patient 
and/or visitor violence, and 42 percent had experienced physical patient and/or visitor 
violence (Hahn, 2010). Within the last few years, an Australian study of 94 nursing wards 
in 21 hospitals reported 65 percent of nurses had perceived emotional abuse during their 
previous five shifts at work. (Roche, 2007)   The China Daily reported that during one 
period in 2007, because of violence and attacks on physicians, policemen were stationed 
in and around the Shanghai Minhang District Central Hospital (Li, 2007).  A Turkish 
study of 290 hospitals reported that 80.3 percent of nurses had faced verbal abuse, and 
that it had decreased their professional performance (Oztunc, 2006).  Violence on patient 
care units is both an international and a growing problem (Farrell, Bobrowski, & 
Bobrowski, 2006, and Cowan, 2002).  
Statement of the Problem 
 
This study will explore the growing number of aggressive, abusive, and violent 
acts perpetrated by patients and visitors on patient care units.  Many victims of violence 
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today bring with them into hospitals all the mental complexities, physical pain, and 
emotional worries conducive to a continuation of violence.  The challenge hospitals are 
facing is how to prevent, mitigate, control, and respond to such violence within the caring 
and compassionate nature of the hospital environment.  Methods must be found to meet 
the needs of arriving victims without claiming care providers as collaterally damaged 
victims themselves.   
 Violence is harming patients, care providers and hospitals. Violence harms 
patients by changing or reducing care providers’ attitudes toward them. The attitude and 
behavior of a care provider dealing with violence on a care unit is different from one on a 
unit without violence.  Violence takes away from care providers’ concentration and 
attention to patients. Violence in hospitals is harming the physical, mental, and emotional 
states of care providers.  Care providers are leaving the profession, retiring early and not 
promoting patient care as a profession because of violence.  Violence harms the 
reputation of hospitals.   The reputation of a hospital affects patient selection or non-
selection for care.  Reputation also influences the physician’s choice of where to practice 
and helps job seekers decide where to apply and work.  (Roche M, 2010, Sofield & 
Salmond, 2003, Luck, Jackson & Usher, 2007) 
Purpose of Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine if a one-hour de-escalation and self-
defense training, performed without overtime or call in pay, targeting all care providers 
on a hospital unit can reduce violence as compared to historical records of the same unit 
and concurrent comparison with control units.  The reasons for pursuing the study are to 
improve the work environment for patient care providers, and thereby allow for improved 
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quality of care for patients.  Violence in a patient care setting can cause mental anguish 
for patients and visitors as well as care providers.  Time attended to and care providers 
waste recovering from violence.  
History of this Study 
 
During the summer of 2009, a group of nurses at TGH convinced administration 
that patients were becoming increasingly aggressive, abusive, or violent.  They expressed 
the concern that these violent and potentially violent acts were having a negative impact 
on their work environment and their ability to provide quality patient care.  Some nurses 
of the group believed that this was why many of their colleagues were retiring.    
Tampa General Administration formed a committee to investigate the nurses' 
concerns and make recommendations for improvement.  The nurses who had originally 
brought this matter to administration’s attention organized the committee.   Hospital 
departments of Risk Management, Security, Research, Safety, Quality Improvement, 
Clergy, the Emergency Department, and the Mental Health unit were asked to provide 
members to the committee.  The committee was titled the “Problem Patient Committee.”   
Hypothesis  
Hypothesis as a scientific formula using the null hypothesis follows: 
 µ = Number of calls to security for assistance from patient care staff.   
µ1 =Number of calls for security assistance from the Comparison Units. 
µ2 = Number of calls for security assistance from the Experimental Units. 
Null hypothesis   Ho: µ1 = µ2 
Alternative hypothesis         Ha: µ2 ≠ µ1 
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If calls to security for assistance by patient care staff concerning violence is 
related to care providers’ knowledge of de-escalation and perception of ability to defend 
one’s self,  then providing a de-escalation and self-defense training will reduce the 
number of times patient care staff call security for assistance.  Calls for assistance from 
security before and after the intervention will serve as the measure for quantifying 
violence on the patient care unit. Calls to security for assistance are documented on Code 
Gray reports. 
Delimitations of the Study 
Delimitations are internal to the study but not within the researcher’s control. 
• This study is delimited in that the researcher may offer participation to a 
nurse manager but that manager may decline participation.  
•  This study is also delimited to the events reported by the care providers.   
Limitations of the Study 
 
  Limitations are aspects external to the study not under the control of the 
researcher. The following are some limitations of this study: 
• This study was  conducted at a large teaching hospital, so findings may not 
be applicable for smaller hospitals, or to other large hospitals due to 
patient mix differences.  
• Reporting systems with other hospitals may not capture the same 
information, so comparison may be difficult. 
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Unique Nature of this Study 
 There are two unique characteristics of this research.  First, the intervention was 
designed by hospital staff and patient care providers, and was crafted to be minimally 
invasive with respect to time and limited in cost.  The intervention is only one hour long 
and can be presented at unit department meetings without requiring overtime or changing 
care providers’ schedules.  It is comprised of real care providers’ experiences, which are 
easily recognized by peers.  It is designed to be dramatic, engaging, and hands-on.  The 
intervention acknowledges the importance of teamwork, confidence, and respect, and 
targets at least 85 percent of patient care staff on a unit.  
Second is the research design and implementation.  Numerous hospital violence 
research studies rely upon retrospective, self-reported, cross-sectional design.  The 
inquiries embedded in questionnaires and self-reporting used in these studies rely upon 
broad definitions of violence and differing timeframes.  There is little information about 
the validity of the questionnaires or of the self-reporting forms used in past studies 
(Findorff, 2005, Hahn, 2008).  This study is designed to collect quantitative data using a 
quasi-experimental approach.  There is no questionnaire or self-reporting.  The reporting 
mechanism has been stable and utilized for notification of patient and visitor violence in 
the same manner since 2005.  If an event report was completed, it meant that a care 
provider faced a situation that was or could turn violent.   
The researcher reviewed historical records for Code Grays for all patient care 
units and provided the eight units with the most reported violent events to Patient Care 
Leadership.  Prior to the training, the researcher explained to Nursing Administration the 
importance that several items related to the research remain stable during its duration.  
Patient Care leadership suggested two units for experimentation and asked that the 
 11 
 
remaining six be the comparison group.  After the year of monthly monitoring was 
completed, the researcher reviewed the comparison and experimental units to determine 
if  leadership (person in charge), staffing matrix (number and type of care providers per 
patient), types of injuries or illness of patients treated, policies and procedures and 
physical location of the units had changed.  No discernible changes occurred that would 
affect this study.  The participating units are similar in that they all reported more 
violence than the average hospital unit.  The eight units all dealt with seriously injured or 
critically ill patients, and with family members who demonstrated worry and anxiety.  
The staffing scheduling and routine hospital issues were similar.     
During the literature review, only one study was found utilizing a comparison 
group.  It was not a hospital based study and depended on pre and post self-reported 
events.  (Arnetz & Arnetz, 2000)  No study was found using hospital event reports as a 
data collection tool.  No study was found that implemented an intervention designed to 
reduce violence in a hospital.   
The implementation of the intervention was organized to meet the actual working 
requirements of a major hospital.  Restrictions imposed by nursing leadership could be 
anticipated if the intervention proved successful and was chosen for implementation at 
other hospitals.  The time, expense, and data collection tools are likely to be very similar 
in other large hospitals.       
  The only example of  research approaching a quasi-experimental design on 
hospital-based violence was a Swiss study (2004) in which a systematic aggression risk 
assessment combined with a standardized course in aggression management was 
implemented on an acute admission psychiatric unit.  The number and severity of the 
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aggressive incidents were registered and measured.  The comparison was with historical 
events but no concurrent comparisons were performed.  It concluded that on such a unit, 
the particular combination of interventions may assist in reducing the incidence of 
coercive measures, but further study was also recommended.  (Needham, 2004) 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
This literature review focuses on determining the extent and severity of violence 
committed by patients and visitors on hospital care units.  It begins by contrasting the 
media portrayal of such events with studies of actual violence occurring on care units.  
Next presented are studies that explain the frequency, type, and severity of care 
providers’ experiences on patient units.  Background material includes multidisciplinary 
constructs, models, violence theory, challenges to the definition of violence, 
underreporting, and recommendations from other studies, which support the intervention 
in this study.  
Media Coverage 
In 2010, physicians were shot at both Johns Hopkins Hospital and Baton Rouge 
General Medical Center and each event made headlines.  In 2011, physicians were shot at 
Florida Hospital Orlando and Physicians’ Regional Medical Center, each again reported 
in news headlines.  The popular dramatic television series "Grey’s Anatomy" depicted a 
gunman in their hospital for the season six finale.  These news stories and television 
episodes elucidate the violence actually occurring in hospitals, yet do not fully disclose 
the extent of the problem.  The larger story is the ongoing violence that care providers are 
subjected to by patients and visitors.  This unpublicized and little known violence 
disrupts hospital environments, operations and objectives, and in so doing threatens their 
effectiveness to save lives and promote health.   
 14 
 
Frequency of Hospital Violence 
Surveys and studies have documented the frequency of hospital violence in recent 
times.  One such survey, by the International Association of Healthcare Security and 
Safety (IAHSS), of 212 hospitals, reported 660 aggravated assaults and 2,720 simple 
assaults in 2009  (IAHSS 2010).  A 2009 British survey of nurses confirmed 33 percent 
had been punched, 19 percent kicked, 17 percent spit on, and 8 percent had had hair 
pulled.  A 2003 Massachusetts Nurses Association survey reported that 50 percent of 
nurses questioned were punched at least once during a two-year period, and that 91 
percent of nurses reported verbal abuse in the past month.  (Fierce Healthcare)  These 
studies demonstrate a problem exists beyond news headlines and television shows, 
impacting significant numbers of care providers and in so doing impacting patients.    
The International Association for Healthcare Security and Safety, the professional 
association of hospital security administrators, attempts to track crime in hospitals.  In 
their 2004 Crimes Survey, 192 hospitals documented 7,764 crimes, while in the 2010 
Crimes Survey 212 hospitals documented 14,991 crimes.  The definitions of crime and 
method of reporting did not change during that time. (IAHSS, 2006)  This indicates 
increased aggression, abuse and/or violence. 
Hospitals both in the United States and internationally use the IAHSS training and 
certifications to train security staff.  The BASIC Training Manual and Study Guide for 
Healthcare Security Officers presents a study performed by the Department of Medicine 
at the University Of Louisville, which surveyed 170 teaching hospitals: 
• 32% of respondents stated they had received one or more verbal threats 
per day 
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• 18% acknowledged that once a month or greater, a weapon was displayed 
as a result of a threat 
• 43% affirmed medical staff were subject to one or more physical attacks 
per month 
• 70% confirmed that at least one act of violence led to a death in the past 
five years  (Lehman & Scaglione, pp. 12, 13-20) 
This study points out that aggression, abuse, and violence committed by patients in 
hospitals are both frequent and severe.   
 Decisions concerning the value and appropriateness of resources committed to 
reduce, mitigate, and prevent such events must be based on individual hospital data.  
There is no national data bank currently collecting information from hospitals concerning 
violence.  Consequently, it is impossible to cite definitively the frequency or severity of 
this problem. 
Underreporting 
There is adequate data that violence is prevalent in hospitals, but also that the true 
scope of the problem may be underreported.  Russell Collings, a health care security 
consultant who advises the Joint Commission states,  “Many incidents go underreported 
because they do not fall into the hospital’s definition of ‘violence’ but others are omitted 
because officials do not want them to reflect negatively on the hospital’s image.”  
(Hospitals & Health Networks Page 27, Howell, 2011)  In 2000, the ENA published 
research indicating that up to 80 percent of all abusive acts committed by patients are not 
reported.  Reasons cited for nurses underreporting included  a) accepting such events as 
part of the job, b) misunderstanding what should be reported (definition), c) fearing that 
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something inappropriate was done to provoke the attack and fear of reprimand, and d) 
disliking the time it takes to complete the reports (Erickson, 2000).  Another study of 
nearly 8,800 nurses in 201 hospitals revealed that 70 percent of nurses experiencing 
abuse had not reported the mistreatment (Duncan & Hyndman, 2001).  Further, one study 
suggested that nurses feel unsupported by management in relation to workplace violence, 
and this influences their decision not to report.  (Jackson, Claire, & Mannix, 2002)  
Underreporting could be the reason a study in 2007 concluded that some hospital 
administrators do not know violence occurs in their hospitals. (Phillips 2007)  
Impact on Care Providers 
 
  A patient or visitor may witness or participate in a violent event but is soon gone 
from the hospital.  The care provider, however, remains, and may encounter violence day 
after day, leading to physical, mental, and emotional hardship.  The National Advisory 
Council on Nurses Education and Practice (NACNEP, 2007) presented a report to the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services beginning with the following paragraph: 
          “Violence against nurses is a complex and persistent occupational hazard 
facing the nursing profession. This violence can take the form of intimidation, 
harassment, stalking, beatings, stabbings, shootings, and other forms of assault.  
Nurses are among the most assaulted workers in the American workforce.  
Psychological consequences resulting from violence may include fear, anxiety, 
sadness, depression, frustration, mistrust, and nervousness.  These consequences 
can have a negative impact on nurse retention”.  
(http:/bhpr.hrsa.gov/nursing/NACNEP/reports/fifth/intro.htm, p.1)  
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 In the same document, NACNEP stated that nurses exposed to abuse and violence 
early in their careers became disillusioned with nursing.  Seventy five percent of nurses 
reported having been assaulted during their career, and assaults contributed to many 
leaving the profession.  Aggression, abuse, and violence experienced by care providers 
caused them to feel incompetent, guilty, powerless, worthless, and fearful of criticism.  A 
2005 Maryland Nurses Association survey affirmed that 18 respondents left a job because 
they feared for their safety, and 15 indicated they wanted to leave but had not done so 
(Distasio, Hall, & Beachley, 2005, 38).  Veteran nurses reported violence as contributing 
to burnout and resignations. (Shader et al., 2001)     
Impacts of Verbal Assaults 
 
Nurses experiencing non-physical (verbal) assaults sometimes exhibit symptoms 
of emotional and psychological trauma.  Such assaults can lead to cumulative stress, 
compassion fatigue, apathy, flashbacks, crying spells, intrusive thoughts, and nightmares, 
and may culminate in increased use of sick time (Phillips, 2007).  Fifty-three percent of 
nurses in a verbal assault study stated they would not recommend nursing as a career 
choice for their children, and 23 percent would actively discourage someone close to 
them from entering the profession. (Keough, Schlomer, & Bollember, 2003)     
Impacts of Physical Events 
 
 A comprehensive summation of the impact of physical violence on patient care 
staff was found in an English textbook.  Jonathan Shepherd, author of Violence in Health 
Care, A Practical Guide to Coping with Violence and Caring for Victims (1994), divided 
the effects into four categories:  psychological, physical, behavioral, and long term.  An 
individual can suffer any one or any combination of these.   Psychological effects of 
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assault included depression, guilt, loss of confidence, loss of sense of professional 
competence, increased feelings of vulnerability, self-doubt, unfocused anger, irritability, 
generalized anxiety, and decreased concentration.  Physical effects of assault included 
insomnia, nightmares, and change in appetite, decreased sexual activity, and complaints 
such as lethargy, headaches, muscle tension, and nausea.  The behavioral effects included 
increased alcohol, cigarette and drug consumption, increased startle response and 
absenteeism, avoidance of patient contact, social withdrawal, loss of interest and 
involvement in work, and phobic avoidance of reminders of the assault.  Long term 
effects included “burn out syndrome” and post-traumatic stress disorder, and possibly 
resignation.  (Jonathan Shepherd, 1994)  
Examples of Patient and Visitor Violence  
 
Melinda Mercer Ray provides three short examples to show how aggression, 
abuse and violence are acted out in hospitals.  “A young psychiatric patient hallucinates 
and begins to bite, scratch, and kick whoever walks up to her.  A frantic family in the 
waiting room demands information and storms into the treatment area, pushing nurses 
and other staff aside.  Or, a drunken college student wants to fight his way out of the 
hospital, pushing and spitting on anyone who does not get out of his way.”  (Ray, 2007)  
Ann Longmore-Ethridge supplies another vivid example. She writes of an 
instance of an elderly man in the hospital for a chronic ailment.  His three children visited 
regularly – one of whom at one point became more insistent about almost every aspect of 
his care.  He leaned out of his father’s room and snapped his fingers, yelling, 'Here, 
puppy!’ to obtain the nurses' attention.  One evening, when a nurse came in to address his 
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concerns about a certain treatment, he threw the bedpan at her.  (Longmore-Ethridge, 
2008)  
Violence Constructs 
Theories and models about possible motivations of perpetrators and causative 
factors are available to guide development of interventions to reduce or prevent violence 
on patient care units.  Methods, constructs, theories and assumptions that might prove 
helpful in refining the intervention implementation are also abundant.   Collecting, 
reviewing and synthesizing this information to provide insight and direction for 
elimination or reduction of the violence problem on care units are foundational to this 
study.   
   Functional and symbolic sociological concepts impact care providers’ responses 
to violent events.  These two different approaches are evident in the decision making 
process for reporting:  a care provider acting on the functional approach is likely to 
follow through with a report, while one acting on the symbolic approach may or may not 
do so.   The functional approach defines violence as subversive of order, and as such 
needs to be restrained.  This approach values law and order as necessary to maintain 
social stability, and seeks to reduce or eliminate violence because of perceived harm to 
society.  The functional approach encourages reporting as well as strict enforcement of 
rules and policies against deviant actions.  A care provider acting out the functional 
approach may respond quickly and confrontationally, possibly neglecting to consider 
individual and situational variables.  In contrast, the symbolic approach defines violence 
as subjective and possibly the result of cultural differences.  This approach agrees that 
one side of violence is subversive and must be controlled, but supposes that violence can 
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be constructive in destroying an old order and constructing a new order.  The patient care 
provider acting out the symbolic approach may wish to wave a rule or allow some 
aggressive and abusive behaviour, rationalizing that it may have been predicated by the 
situation.  This paradox of approaches creates inconsistencies of action by care providers.  
It is also helpful for responders to understand and appreciate a care giver’s approach in 
order to adjust to their responses and requested actions appropriately (Stewart and 
Strathern, 2002). 
Biological factors are arguably a contributing factor in violence.   Thomas Hobbs, 
often called the Father of Analytic Philosophy, writes in his book Human Nature
National Institute of Justice Violence Workshop  
 in 1650 
that men are naturally violent and aggressive.  He supported the concept that violence is a 
propensity rooted in the biology and psychology of the human.  Sigmund Freud 
supported this relationship between biology and violence by associating aggression and 
sexuality. (Stewart & Strathern, 2002)  Freud proposed that violence is a primordial force 
manifested when pleasure seeking through sexual acts or pain avoidance is frustrated.  
Whether man is innately violent or not is beyond the scope of this study, but the concept 
holds ramifications for development and presentation of the intervention.  
 
 The National Institute of Justice sponsored a workshop on violence theory in 
2007.  Participants compared, contrasted and evaluated both conventional and developing 
theories. Conventional scientific criteria for theory evaluation included: 
• Parsimony—simple statements with maximum explanatory power are optimal. 
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• Generality—a theory should account for as much variation in the facts as 
possible.  
• Testability—testing a theory’s formulations and hypotheses should be feasible. 
• Validity—a theory’s propositions and observations of reality should match. 
• Originality—new ideas should give a better explanation of behavior than 
previously available.   
Participants were instructed to include the following in future violence theory: 
• A tangible principle for the concept of time and space—theories should explain 
the relevance of emotional development to actions later in life as it relates to 
predicting violent behavior. 
• Concreteness to reduce distortion—abstract theories are easily misunderstood and 
twisted.   
• Restriction to small-scale violence—focus should be on illegitimate or deviant 
violence, as opposed to acts of war.   
Violence was segmented into three types.  Type One violence is that ostensibly 
provoked by other violence or negative conditions.  An example in Feminist theory is that 
violence is necessary as a response to perception that gender blocks accomplishment of 
goals though legitimate channels.  Type Two violence is committed to solve a problem.  
Violent Structures theory rationalizes violence as exigent when a person’s sense of justice 
has been violated because action is needed to correct the violation.  Type Three violence 
is categorized as processes, which may motivate or cause violence.  Radical Ecology 
theory, for instance, manifests that low exposure to lead causes violence.   
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Various theories have been developed to elaborate on violence.  Robert Dubin 
developed Strain Theory in 1959.  He maintains that violence is the result of an 
individual or group taking actions outside the norm because of strains due to desire for 
social or personal gain. Robert Agnew, in 1992, adjusted Strain Theory to include 
individual characteristics that possibly create and control interpersonal strains.  Such 
attributes as temperament, intelligence, interpersonal skills, self-efficacy, social support, 
association with antisocial groups, age and status are cited.  When the individual’s 
perceived desires are greater than their control, the Strain Theory would predict violence.  
Strain Theory accords that to reduce anger, aggression and violence on a care unit, a 
hospital should identify and develop methods to reduce the strains on patients, visitors 
and care givers.  
Another theory, Travis Hirsch’s Control Balance Theory, states that violence is 
the result of an imbalance between society and an individual’s desired achievement.  
When a personal achievement has priority over an institutional norm, an imbalance exists 
which may propagate deviant behavior.  If the individual’s perceived gain surpasses his 
perceived social controls, a deviant act such as violence can result.  This theory points out 
that excessive control or lack of control may affect deviant behavior.  Additionally, the 
stronger the bond between the person and society, the less likely they are to engage in 
criminal acts.  Three specific actions are delineated in the Control Balance Theory: 
predation, consisting of predators’ actions, deviance, consisting of deliberate 
inappropriate action to demonstrate individual power, and submission, consisting of a 
victim completely obeying authority.  Control Balance Theory contributes to this study 
by emphasizing the need for security and care provider training to control predator 
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designs.  Listening to and observing a patient is expounded as the best way to predict and 
avert tendencies of aggression and violence.  Interestingly, proponents of Control 
Balance Theory show concern that while the economic stability of the 1990s moved a 
significant number of people into a balanced control ratio and reduced violence, the 
opposite is occurring today.  They warn that the current economy is changing the balance 
control ratio, which could lead to increasing violence for the next several years.  
The Social Learning Theory is one of the most influential theories of learning and 
development.  It postulates that threatening or acting violent is often learned.  The three 
core concepts are:  1) people learn by observation, 2) a person’s internal mental state is 
an essential part of learning and 3) learning alone does not mean the person will change 
behavior.  Albert Bandura added a fourth core concept to Social Learning Theory - the 
ability of a person to learn just by watching the actions of others and anticipating similar 
results by adopting similar actions:  
 “Learning would be exceedingly laborious, not to mention hazardous, if 
people had to rely solely on the effects of their own actions to inform them what to 
do. Fortunately, most human behavior is learned observationally through 
modeling: from observing others one forms an idea of how new behaviors are 
performed, and on later occasions this coded information serves as a guide for 
action." 
-Albert Bandura, Social Learning Theory, 1977 (B 2) 
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This theory is important to this study because it emphasizes the need of including 
behavior modeling in the intervention.  It also supports actual hands-on demonstration 
and practice of concepts by participants.  (Cherry 2011) 
Cohen and Felson proposed Routine Activities Theory, stating that criminal and 
violent actions are often the result of clearly thought out rational decisions.  The Routine 
Activities Theory contends that for a crime, or violence, to take place, three requirements 
are necessary: a motivated offender, a suitable target, and an absence of capable 
guardians (Cohen, 2002).  The first requirement indicates that in some circumstances the 
individual arriving as a patient might be inclined to violence or aggression.  The second 
requirement is significant because hospitals have a reputation for allowing and 
understanding socially deviant behaviors as caused by the illness or injury and not the 
person.  Therefore, a perpetrator may see a hospital as an environment where deviant 
actions are less noticeable, and apprehension and prosecution are unlikely.  The third 
requirement indicates that normal routines may allow the crime to go unnoticed or not 
prosecuted.  Hospitals focus on patients’ and family members’ care and comfort. To 
maintain a family friendly atmosphere, hospitals avoid closed and locked doors and 
access control systems. Open doors and uncontrolled access create an environment that 
allows many crimes to go unnoticed until it is too late to perform proper investigations.  
This theory explains why hospitals can be easy targets for criminals. 
Donald Black conceived Social Geometry Theory, which states that social space 
and social direction are the foundations for action, rather than the individual.  Social 
Geometry Theory predicts that the greater the social distance between participants at the 
time of the event, the greater the possibility of violence.  Social distance for this theory is 
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not specifically defined, but the context would indicate that it is the differences between 
peoples’ economic, political and class distinctions.  Social Geometry is not taken into 
account when patients are admitted in a hospital.  All classes, economic levels, races, and 
educational levels are mixed, as people become patients in a hospital.  This theory 
provides some understanding that care providers need to recognize individual patient’s 
social norms and attempt to make accommodations.  (NIJ, Workshop, 2002) 
All of these theories contributed to recommended actions and attitudes included 
within the training developed for this study.  The Strain Theory broadens caregivers’ 
awareness of the stresses and strains patients and visitors feel when having to be in a 
hospital.  Therefore, empathy is a key factor in de-escalation training.  (Robert Dubin, 
1959)  The Violence Structures Theory supports another key de-escalation factor - that 
negative events are cumulative and it is best to intervene as soon as possible to prevent 
them from escalating.  This highlights the importance of listening to and observing 
signals of a patient, family member or visitor to recognize if they are experiencing 
personal challenges, which might be manifested in their actions.  (Stewart & Strathern, 
2002)  Control Balance Theory supports the intervention proposal that all care providers 
must envision how their actions will be interpreted by other shifts as time passes.  
Patients and visitors may observe inconsistencies and interpret them as unfair or 
controlling on the part of staff.  Care providers must be careful to interpret and explain 
actions observed.  One example of this is a night nurse allowing a visitor to sleep in a 
waiting room but in the morning the day shift telling him it is against the rules and calling 
security.  (Branson 2005)  Social Learning Theory led to the 85% participation 
requirement.  This theory reminds managers and leaders that one person acting 
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inappropriately could become a model for others and increase deviation from desired 
behaviors. The Routine Activities Theory provides insight into the importance of the 
work environment and encourages review of operational tasks that could promote or 
discourage deviant or violent behavior.  It underscores the importance of visible security.  
It also suggests proper signage about appropriate behavior.  The Social Geometry Theory 
can assist when deciding to what nurse or room a patient is assigned, acknowledging that 
similar persons may get along better, and recognizing that the social distance between 
care provider and patient may influence the actions of both parties in the healthcare 
setting.  Life-course, Developmental and /or Integrative Theory demonstrates the 
complexity of identifying differing ethos that should be considered when communicating.  
Awareness and appreciation for both the diverse and similar characteristics of theories 
concerning violence provides a foundation for the development and implementation of 
this study.  (Gottesman & Brown. 2010) 
Conceptual Models of Violence 
 
Four models of violence will be presented.  These are the Theory of Violence 
Model by Jonathan Shepherd, the Public Health Model from the Centre for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), the Socio-Ecological Model also developed by the CDC, 
and Riches’ Triangle Model.  
The Violence Theory Model is from Violence in Health Care (Shepherd, 1994, p. 
19).  This model includes many existing theories and risk factors.  Long and short term 
influences on an individual that create the potential for violence are part of this model.  
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Long Term influences:  biological, individual, 
family peer, school, community, society , law
Long Term violence potential:  between-
individual differences
Short Term violence 
potential:  within-
individual variations
Cognitive process:  
decisions, costs, 
benefits, probabilities, 
scrips
Violence
Consequences:  reinforcement, punishment, 
labeling, learning
Short Term 
influences:  
borded, angry, 
drunk, frustrated
Life events
Routine 
activities
Opportunity,
Victims 
 
Figure 2.1:  Violence Theory Model (Modified from, Stewart & Strathern, 2002) 
 The two models which follow were developed by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention. The CDC’s first model is a four-level social-ecological model (CDC, 
2011).  It provides understanding of what influences violence and of the impacts of 
potential prevention strategies. 
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Figure 2.2:  CDC Public Health Model I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CDC’s second model is designed to explain violence in terms of 
characteristics within the individual, close relationships, the community and the greater 
society (CDC, 2011).  Factors of the individual segment of this model include biological 
items such as age and health, and personal history items such as education, income, 
substance use or history of abuse.  Prevention strategies include educational presentations 
designed to change attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours.  Factors of the relationship segment 
include social-circle peers, partners, and family.  Prevention strategies include mentoring 
and peer programs to reduce conflict, foster problem solving, and promote healthy 
Relationships 
Societal 
Community 
Individual 
Figure 2.3:  CDC Characteristics of Violence Model II 
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relationships. Factors of the community segment include environmental characteristics 
such as school, workplaces, and neighbourhoods.  Prevention strategies include 
marketing campaigns to foster community climate, processes, and polices to promote 
healthy relationships. Factors of the societal segment may encourage or inhibit violent 
actions.  Prevention strategies include programs impacting the health, economic, and 
education systems as well as cultural norms, social policies, and inequalities.  
 The final model, Riches’ Triangle Model, is widely accepted among violence 
researchers. It presents the concept that the perspective and relationships of the victim, 
perpetrator and witnesses define and determine the appropriateness of a violent action. 
Riches, in 1998, explained violence as a triangle involving the victim, the performer, and 
the witnesses.  "Witnesses" in this model decide if an event is justified and appropriate.   
         
 
 
 
 
 
This model demonstrates that violence, aggression, and abuse are understood 
differently due to participants' perspectives in the situation. The performer normally 
views their actions as justified and appropriate.  The victim normally sees the actions as 
unjust and illegitimate.  Time is also held as a variable in this model.  Riches model states 
that the performer and victim may view their original conclusion differently over time.  
However, at the moment the event occurs, each justifies or rationalizes their belief.  The 
Perpetrator Witness 
Victim 
 
Figure 2.4:  Riches Violence Triangle 
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witness is not seen as an unbiased or completely honest evaluator of the event.  The 
witness's perceptions change depending on his/her relationships and history with the 
victim or performer.  The perspective of the victim, performer and witness may all be 
seen as appropriate depending on the audience and the situation.  Riches’ violence model 
has been used to explain why violence as a sport is not shocking.  The participants are 
performer and victim, and the observer is the witness.  They have a relationship that 
justifies the violence in the name of sport as long as it is within set sports boundaries. 
(Strathern & Stewart, 2004)   
Hallpike in 1979 added passion as a variable to Riches’ model. (Hallpike 1979)   
Progression from irritation, to aggression, to anger and verbal abuse is intensification of 
differences between people’s perceptions, and the violent act is the pinpoint of absolute 
collapse of controlled behaviour. Passion is often observed during acts of aggression, 
abuse and violence in the hospital environment.  
Risk Factors Related to Violence 
 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA) published the 
first nationally accepted list of risk factors for violence in 1996.  The CDC later made 
some changes based on their research, and republished the following list in 2006.  The 
investigator has provided hospital relationships.   
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Table 2.1:  Occupational Risks*  
Risk Factors for all 
Occupations 
Hospital Situational Relationship 
Exchange of Money Gift Shops, cafeteria, pharmacies, cashiers' offices 
Delivery of passengers, goods 
or services 
Employee buses, patient shuttles, movement of 
medications, laboratory specimens and supplies 
A mobile workplace such as a 
taxicab or police cruiser 
Home health services which go to patient homes, 
bloodmobiles, community services 
Working with unstable or 
volatile persons in healthcare, 
social services or criminal 
justice settings 
Life and death situations, long care staff hours, 
worry about patients and feeling the stress of both 
patients and patient family members  
Working alone or in small 
numbers 
Small pockets of employees working during some 
evenings and weekends  
Working late at night or during 
early mornings 
 24/7 environment of hospitals 
Working in high crime areas Some hospitals are located in high crime areas 
Guarding valuable property or 
possessions 
Patient belongings, narcotics, specialized equipment 
Working in community based  
settings 
Community programs and services held at hospitals 
*Risk factors provided by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2002) 
The following table presents the risk factors, again from OSHA, specific to 
hospitals and adds mitigation activities. 
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Table 2.2:  Hospital Risk Factors* 
Hospital Risk Factor Relationship to Study 
Lack of adequately trained, armed or 
visible security guards 
Security training is needed for de-
escalation and communications skills. 
Pain and discomfort Care givers' awareness of patients' pain and 
discomfort creates concern, stress and 
possible feeling of helplessness. 
Family member stress and fear of unknown Family members' stress requires adequate 
communication of social services 
availability.  
Family member anger at unclear and 
conflicting policies and inconsistent 
enforcement 
Care providers need to demonstrate respect 
by allowing for exceptions to policies and 
applying them such that they are 
understandable for the patient and family 
member at the moment of the situation. 
Cramped space Care providers should assist patients and 
visitors with seating and privacy. 
Long wait times Caregivers should explain wait times and 
demonstrate concern. 
Particular ailments such as head injuries, 
senile and adolescents 
Special training is needed for care 
providers who work with special 
populations. 
Culture-specific grieving actions Caregivers should allow as much culture-
specific behavior as possible without 
causing undue hardships on others. 
Intoxication and substance abuse Special training of and understanding by 
care staff and support by security staff are 
needed. 
Police custody  Security involvement and support for care 
staff is necessary. 
Rude or uncaring presentations by staff Intervention by other care providers and 
notification of supervisors to correct 
attitudes is exigent. 
Victims and perpetrators at same location 
(Example: gang members) 
Location, confidentiality, and control of 
visitors must be managed. 
*Risk factors provided by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA, 
2002) 
 33 
 
These risks relate to the complexity and scope of preventing or mitigating 
aggressive, abusive, or violent actions in a hospital.  Identification of the risk factors of 
the patient, visitors and care providers is the first step to preventing, mitigating, or de- 
escalating violence.  Hospital Security Departments rely on incident reports to track and 
trend data. If the data is not accurate due to underreporting, poor decisions can result.  
The severity and frequency of events are normally part of the analysis.  If one event such 
as a suicide or active shooter occurs, this may create the political energy to promote 
security improvements without extensive data collection.  For instance, the shooting at 
Johns Hopkins motivated change at Johns Hopkins and many other hospitals.  The act, as 
well as the publicity, created political motivation, which may prevent similar acts at other 
hospitals.  Minor events, such as patients verbally abusing care providers, may require 
excessive instances before the political landscape is impacted enough to engage action.  
This presents a dilemma for hospital security:  if a hospital security department is either 
expert enough or lucky enough to prevent major public events, it may be viewed as 
effective and not needing to improve, even leading to budget cuts.  It is also important to 
remember that a single major event may create negative publicity, damaging the 
institutions’ reputation and causing loss of patients and revenues.   
It is paradoxical that seeking to keep information about what happened at a 
hospital private also limits the ability of other hospitals to learn from such experiences.  
There was almost no media attention to the shooting of a physician at Florida Hospital 
Orlando, and other hospitals viewed this as an excellent control of media.  Furthermore, 
the ability to track and trend within a city, county, or state does not exist.  Each hospital 
must independently determine if violence is a problem.  There is no current method to 
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accurately quantify the scope and severity of violence occurring on patient care units at 
hospitals across this county or internationally.  Until there is collaboration and 
cooperation between hospitals, data driven studies will remain sketchy.  Individual 
hospitals, however, are working to reduce, mitigate, or prevent violence.  Some of the 
actions taken by most hospitals include surveys of risk, design changes for better lighting 
and visibility, awareness training, development of violence and bullying policies and 
response plans, and classes to improve care providers’ communications skills with 
patients and visitors.  The knowledge and actions of the care provider may be the most 
important elements in preventing, mitigating, and responding to violence on a patient care 
unit.     
Definitions of Violence, Abuse, and Aggression 
There is no single definition of violence, abuse, or aggression standardized for 
research purposes.  Researchers define verbal or physical aggression, abuse, or violence 
to suit particular purposes.  Studies concerning care providers and violence in healthcare 
organizations offer several unique definitions.  One such definition is that of Lauretta 
Luck, James Cook University, Queensland, Australia, who defines violence in terms of 
subcategories of physical and nonphysical violence, where physical violence includes any 
damage to person or property, and non-physical violence covers verbal abuse, threatening 
language and abusive language.  She points out that, “The term violence is not used 
consistently in literature and frequently includes sexual, physical, emotional, or verbal 
abuse, threatening behavior, and damage to property.”  (Luck, 2007, p. 12)  Ms. Luck’s 
definition is broad and applies to research about hurt feelings or damage to property.  
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Mary Findorff, School of Nursing, University of Minnesota, provides a second 
and more concise definition:  “Violence is broadly defined as words and actions that hurt 
people.” (Findorff 2005, p. 23) Her definition is extensive in the respect that it does not 
limit what causes harm to people; however, it eliminates property and items that people 
might hold valuable. Morrison, in 1990, presented violence as, “any verbal, non-verbal, 
or physical behavior that threatens others or property, or that actually harms others or 
property.” (Hahn. 2008) Uniquely, this definition characterizes threats as a form of 
violence. Susan Phillips presents a definition specific to physical assault.  She states that, 
“Physical assault is characterized by hands-on offensive contact or attacks ranging from 
slapping and biting to rape, homicide, and the use of weapons to inflict injury with 
firearms, bombs, or knives”.  Her definition portrays violence broadly to allow for many 
actual modalities.  (Phillips, 2007, p. 210) 
 The Emergency Nurses Association's Emergency Department Violence 
Surveillance Study seems to make the definition larger in scope by including aggression, 
but limits the definition to the workplace.  She defines violence as “an act of aggression 
directed toward persons at work or on duty, ranging from offensive or threatening 
language to homicide. Workplace violence is commonly understood as any physical 
assault, emotional or verbal abuse, or threatening, harassing, or coercive behavior in the 
work setting that causes physical and/or emotional harm.”  (ENA, 2010, p. 11)  The 
ENA has also been involved in political activities to strengthen penalties and develop 
national standards for responses to violence. 
Finally, the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) definition of 
violence is provided.  It is not designed specifically for healthcare, but because it is 
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federal law, an OSHA compliance officer can cite a hospital after a reported violent 
event.  OSHA states, “Workplace violence is any physical assault, threatening behavior, 
or verbal abuse occurring in the work setting.  A work place may be any location either 
permanent or temporary where an employee performs any work related duty."  This 
includes, but is not limited to, buildings and surrounding perimeters including parking 
lots and field locations, as well as clients’ homes and travel to and from work 
assignments.  OSHA provides specific examples, such as rape and shootings, as well as 
more general examples, such as inappropriate remarks and threats.  Interestingly, 
interpretation of violence can be different for employers, employees, and witnesses.  
(OSHA, 2012) 
  OSHA defines risk in the form of permissible exposure limits based on scientific 
research.  They do not attempt to examine how much violence, aggression or abuse is 
permissible.  Employers should take caution because this definition allows an individual 
employee to complain to OSHA based on their personal definition.  There is also no 
method to enforce or control many of the examples in this definition.  (NIOSH, 2002)  
Inconsistencies and conflicts, such as those presented in these definitions, manifest 
themselves in a care provider’s decision whether to complete an incident report for an 
event.  If there is a witness, that witness may influence the decision.  However, if only the 
care provider and the patient or visitor is involved, then uncertainty can cause non-
reporting.  For reporting purposes, a hospital may not have a written definition of 
violence. Hospitals often defer to a Risk Management concept that anything out of the 
ordinary should be on an incident report.  How is a care provider to determine if 
aggression, abuse or even violence is out of the ordinary given the specific set of 
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circumstances and the emotional state of the patient or visitor?  Care providers' personal 
histories, cultures, races, education levels, environments, and states of mind at the time 
may influence their decision.  In fact, the numbers of incidents reported are far below 
those acknowledged during studies.  
Reporting and Increases of Violence  
 
Reports of violence in hospitals are limited to recent history. Bryan Warren, 
President-Elect of the International Association of Healthcare Safety and Security, stated 
for the media after the shooting of a transplant surgeon in Orlando, Florida, in May 2011, 
“Hospitals at one time were much like churches and schools, and were considered 
somewhat sacred.  Unfortunately, that’s not the case anymore.”  (Shrieves, 14)  The 
Journal of Healthcare Protection Management provides additional support for this 
viewpoint (1998, 43).  This report describes hospitals as once revered places of healing 
and caring.  Healthcare professionals have lost the reverent and protected status they 
historically held.  Burgess in 1994 states:  “Violence in America is increasing.  It has 
moved from the home to community and into the workplace, and it has exacted a 
staggering toll of victims.  Violence is occurring even in formerly protected and 
sacrosanct environments, such as schools, hospital, and places of worship.” (Platt & 
Mays, 1998)  The Journal of Health Care Protection Management conducted crime 
surveys of hospitals in 2000/2001 and in 2005.  The 2000-2001 crime survey indicates 
patients committed 6% percent of crimes in hospitals, while the 2005 survey indicated 
patients committed 29% of crimes.  The crimes mentioned in both surveys were simple 
assaults.   
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The Florida Society for Healthcare Security, Safety, and Emergency Management 
Professional Conference focused on violence for 2011.  Caroline Ramsey-Hamilton, a 
Risk Management, and Security Consultant who has done work for the Joint 
Commission, presented why she believes violence is increasing in hospitals:   
1.  Doctors are no longer thought of as “Gods.”  This means they are more easily 
blamed when a patient’s condition deteriorates.  
2. Hospitals are now regarded as businesses.  This perception has been aggravated 
by television as well as by the effects of the recession on jobs and the loss of 
health insurance.  
3. There is lack of respect and resources (funding) for hospital security departments.  
Rather than being seen as a crucial protection for the hospital staff and patients, 
many security departments are chronically underfunded and used for a variety of 
non-security functions, such as making bank deposits for hospital gift shops.   
Ramsey-Hamilton also points out that Security Directors' duties have changed from 
what was historically internal security to include: 
• managing contract staff,  
• de-escalating violent patients, 
•  performing risk assessments to prevent infant abduction,  
• operating valet and parking garages, 
• collecting and handling cash from valet and parking garages, 
•  coordinating landing and departure of  helicopters,  
• training law enforcement to sit with prisoners, 
• enforcing visitor control programs, 
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• assisting employees with domestic violence, 
• investigating harassment claims, and 
• handling risk management investigations and claims. 
Her experience indicates that while the duties have grown the budgets have not kept pace 
with the expansion.  (Ramsey-Hamilton, 2011) 
De-Escalation and Self-Defense Training  
 
Several studies have suggested that de-escalation and self-defense training maybe 
successful in providing care staff the tools and confidence to reduce and prevent 
escalation of violence by patients or visitors.  They recommend de-escalation and self-
defense training based on anecdotal reports, questionnaires, and surveys.  Several suggest 
actual implementation of an intervention and qualitative testing.   
• The National Advisory Council on Nurse Education and Practice 
(NACNEP) recommends offering violence prevention and management 
training in the workplace and keeping violence and security issues on the 
radar screen of risk managers in health care facilities.  (NACNEP, 2005) 
• Laura Sofield and Susan W. Salmond studied verbal abuse and care staff 
turnover.  They stated that, “Through education and policy 
implementation, an organization can effectively empower its nurses to 
eliminate verbal abuse.” (Sofield and Salmond, 2003, p. 37) 
• The Service Employees International Union and the American Federation 
of State, County and Municipal Employees had the Department of Labor 
& Industries, Safety and Health Assessments and Research Prevention 
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perform research into violence and recommended providing for adequate 
facility staffing to ensure that all staff attend de-escalation, restraint, and 
containment training.   
• Italian research at the Padua University Hospital, School of Nursing, into 
violence, aggression prevention, and management strategies for violence 
in European renal units concluded that violence prevention and 
management strategies are not widely implemented in Europe.  
Dissemination of information about prevention and management of 
violence aggression is vital.  (2010) 
• The Emergency Nurses Association in 1994 recommended mandatory 
annual training to recognize and defuse potentially violent situations.   
• The Emergency Care Research Institute (ECRI)  in 2005 recommended 
each hospital perform a violence risk assessment and management training 
including techniques for identification, de-escalation, and response to 
violence.  
• The two most important factors in determining a clinician's confidence 
when managing aggression are training and use of prevention and 
intervention strategies.  (Martin T. & Daffern M., 2006)  
• Participants’ evaluation of aggression training supported such training as a 
durable, positive change in care providers’ confidence to handle difficult 
situations.  (Collins 1994, Beech & Leather, 2003)   
• Tampa General Hospital emergency department requires annual de-
escalation and self-defense training.  While emergency departments are 
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generally recognized as the most violent part of a hospital, the TGH ED 
did not record as many violent episodes as some other care units.  
The greatest weakness in the literature reviewed and in most studies of violence in 
hospitals is the method of data collection.  Erickson in 2000 performed a review of health 
care assault research and concluded it was subject to retrospective recall resulting in bias 
due to subjective memory.  Hospital administrators are careful decision makers and need 
facts to support a problem and make the best decision for addressing the problem.  This 
study was experimental and provided quantitative evidence.   
Conclusion 
 
As this literature review has illustrated, developing a method to reduce and 
prevent violence on hospital care units is exigent.  Widely publicized extreme violence is 
not indicative of actual, routine, violence in hospitals.  The public has not been provided 
the frequency, severity or harm from violence committed by patients and visitors on care 
units.  Studies support that such routine violence holds dire consequences for care 
providers.  Constructs, theories and models reviewed provide the basis for development 
and implementation of the intervention proposed in this study.  Finally, several previous 
studies recommended implementation of de-escalation and self-defense training and 
monitoring of the results.  This study will attempt to perform that function.   
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Chapter 3:  Methodology 
The methodology for this study was formulated to answer why the 
research is important, how the research will be conducted, what data will be collected, 
and what particular methods will be utilized for analysis.  The importance of this study 
was demonstrated when TGH Nursing staff approached hospital leadership with their 
concerns about violence. They stated that violence seemed to be increasing, was 
impacting their ability to provide quality patient care, and contributing to nursing 
retirement.   
Research was initiated by developing an intervention utilizing violence theory and 
constructs.  A presentation was developed to increase care provider sensitivity, and to 
provide verbal and physical methods to de-escalate or escape violence.  The sensitivity 
and awareness section of the training was developed to improve the attitude and ability of 
care providers to anticipate violent tendencies of patients and visitors. De-escalation 
taught both nonverbal and verbal methods to calm, display respect, and encourage 
continual dialog.  The self-defence portion provided basic techniques of escaping the 
most common forms of physical contact by patients and visitors, beginning with methods 
to seek assistance and understanding the importance of identified escape routes.  Next 
was demonstration of and practicing escapes from arm grams, clothing grabs, hair pulls, 
and blocking punches.  The physical portion was designed to increase self-confidence 
and encourage care providers to attempt verbal de-escalation as well as self protection 
and escape, if necessary.   
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 Nursing Administration was provided eight units with the highest number of Code 
Gray reports to choose experimental and comparison units for the research.  It was 
decided that two units would be experimental due to the number of nurses to be trained 
and some special requirements requested.  Nursing Administration required all training 
be conducted during normal department meetings and no overtime or call in pay be 
utilized for the training.  The managers of the recommended units still had to volunteer 
their units for participation.  The remaining six units were suggested to be averaged for 
the comparison.  The average was to eliminate the possibility that one unusual disruptive 
patient would skew the comparison.  
Security continued to record events after the presentation.  Monthly, the 
researcher reviewed all reported violence.  No special visits were made to either 
experimental or comparison units by the researcher during the year after the intervention.   
 
Figure 3.1: Baseline Code Grays per Patient Comparisons 
Theory Driven Model Study Design 
This study was designed incorporating the Theory Driven Model developed by 
Chan in 1994.  He proposed that a theory be developed first, followed by a hypothesis 
and questions based on expectations of the theory (Donaldson, 2003, p. 29). The theory 
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for this study is that violence on a care unit can be reduced by care providers’ actions.  
The hypothesis for this study is that de-escalation and self-defense training can reduce 
violence on a hospital unit. The training intervention was application of a 60-minute 
presentation to at least 85% of care providers on a hospital unit, utilizing actual event 
examples and hands on self-defence techniques.    
The critical measurement for this study was the number of times security was 
called for assistance and an event report was generated.  The event reports for twelve 
months before the intervention of each unit was used for historical comparisons.  The 
collection of event reports for all other units during the twelve months after the 
intervention provided information to determine if any hospital-wide changes not 
anticipated or controlled for occurred.  Hospital-wide data provided a baseline for 
stability of the hospital during the research.  The six comparison units’ number of Code 
Grays was averaged to reduce the possibility that one-time events affected the data.  The 
emergency department and the mental health units were excluded from this research 
because of their dissimilarity to the other units.    
Hypothesis Review 
µ = the number of calls to security  
µ1 = the number of calls for security assistance from Comparison Units  
µ2 = the number of calls for security assistance from the Experimental Units 
Null hypothesis               Ho: µ1 = µ2 
Alternative hypothesis    Ha: µ2 ≠ µ1  
 
 
 
 
 45 
 
Method to Test Hypothesis 
This study is applied research to test a method believed to reduce violence on 
patient care units in hospitals.  A successful outcome would be a change in violence on 
experimental units compared to their historical trends and concurrent data with similar 
units.   De-escalation and self-defense training was presented to the experimental units 
,and those numbers were compared with numbers from the comparison units. Completed 
Code Gray critique forms determined the number of events reported per unit.  This same 
reporting process has been in place for over 15 years.   
Similar processes are in place at all hospitals.  This method for testing an 
intervention can be duplicated at most hospitals, utilizing existing employees and 
processes.  Security event reports may be different but a reflection of the frequency of 
events is captured by having reports.  Care units routinely have meetings, so an 
intervention that can be performed during these meetings causes little or no disruption to 
patient care.  Histories and concurrent data are relatively easy to organize and tabulate.  
Reductions of violence in any amount would satisfy most hospital administrators if there 
is little or no expense associated with the reduction. In addition, there can be a positive 
employee morale factor associated with a formal decision to measure and reduce 
incidents of violence.   
 Historical baseline data was used as the criteria for change.  Outliers to the data 
indicated a non-parametric statistical analysis was appropriate.  The non-parametric 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks was performed using SPSS software to determine differences 
within the units over time.  The Mann-Whitney U Test was utilized to evaluate the 
comparison and experimental units.  The statistical significance factor of P<0.05 was 
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accepted. Scatter plots were developed to provide a visual reference. Line charts were 
developed to show trending. Regression analysis was utilized from the SPSS 20.0 
program because of the small number of samples and the non-parametric distribution.  
The Poisson regression model was used for two comparisons: a) the number of events per 
month for the year before the training with the number of events after the training per 
unit, and b) any differences between number of events per month after the intervention 
between comparison and experimental units.  
Study Questions  
 
1. Does a time trend exist regarding reported violence at the hospital before or 
after the training? 
2. Does a time trend exist regarding the reported violence on the experimental 
units before or after the training? 
3. Does a time trend exist regarding the reported violence on the comparison 
units before or after the training? 
4. Will the data collected for one year before and after on the intervention units 
indicate any change in number of reported violent events?   
5. Will there be a difference between the reported number of Code Grays on the 
experimental units and comparison units. 
Assumptions of the Study   
 
This study contains the following assumptions:  
• Care providers at TGH understand to call a Code Gray when they feel 
threatened and need security assistance. 
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• Without some intervention, care providers will report events without change 
as they have historically. 
• Event reports are an indicator of actual number of events occurring on care 
units.  
• Staff and patients on units reporting above average Code Grays are similar to 
those on other units. 
• Aggression, abuse, and violence on units are similar in causation but random 
per location. 
• No harm will come to patients, visitors or care providers resulting from this 
study. 
• Patient care staff on the intervention or comparison units will attend no similar 
de-escalation or self-defense training during the study. 
• Staffing mix and per patient ratios will not change during this study. 
• Management of the patient care units will not change during this study. 
• Patient types and unit services will not change during the study. 
• Security will not change responses to events. 
Process Study as Quality Improvement Activity 
 The Problem Patient Committee utilized several quality improvement processes to 
understand violence on patient care units.  The committee and this researcher had the 
support and approval of TGH administration to design an intervention, present this 
intervention on patient care units, and then compare the results with both the history of 
the same units and with the data collected simultaneously from comparison units.  This 
approval and support made it possible to use the experimental design for this study.  
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 The quasi-experimental design contributes to the internal validity, which is 
crucial to demonstrate if the intervention is associated with any observed changes.  The 
change in the number of Code Gray calls was the variable measured - the indicator of 
effectiveness.  The experiment tested whether participants in the intervention made fewer 
event reports during the year after the training, and if those who did not participate 
continued to make the same average number of event reports as before, or as the trend for 
the unit.    
The intervention was a 60-minute presentation.  Limiting the time to 60 minutes 
made it possible without requiring overtime or changing care providers’ schedules.  The 
time limit was a practical consideration for the study to be replicated on other units and at 
other hospitals.  No other intervention described as de-escalation or self-defense is 
currently offered in this format.  Existing commercially offered violence prevention 
programs require several days of training.   
To control for confounding effects, data was collected for all patient care units 
before, during, and after the intervention.  This data signaled any uncontrolled variables 
and helped determine if any trends on other units changed or developed.  
The de-escalation and self-defense training presented was similar to a program 
that has been presented in the TGH Emergency Department for over ten years.  While 
ERs are traditionally ranked first in frequency of violent events in hospitals across the 
nation, the TGH ER has decreased its rank to between fifth and eighth since the 
institution of this training program.  Since such a dramatic decrease may have been in 
part due to the intervention training, administration was receptive to the possibility of 
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adapting it to and testing a similar approach on care units. This is the first such training to 
patient care staff at TGH.   
No definition of violence was supplied or implied to care providers who 
experienced the training or to those on comparison units.  The comparability of historical 
data to post-intervention data depended on leaving each patient care provider with their 
own internal understanding of what constitutes violence.   
Application to the Systematic Methodology Process 
 
Figure 3.2: The Logical and Systematic Methodology Process 
This study was applied research with the desired outcome to develop a method of 
reducing violence on patient care units in all hospitals.  A successful outcome would be 
an impact of the intervention on experimental units as compared to control units.   The 
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care units . 
2.  Literature review, 
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implementation.  
4.  Implementaton of 
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and review of 
process.  
5.  Analysis of the 
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results adequate for 
application on other 
patient care units.   
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primary method of determining a successful outcome was quantitative.  The number of 
events occurring before and after the intervention on participating units and other hospital 
control units was compared utilizing Wilcoxon Signed Ranks and Poisson Regression. 
Changes in the percentage of physical and verbal events were compared before and after 
the training.    
Application of Methods, Models and Theories  
        Three quality improvement methods were utilized. These included Stakeholder 
Analysis, Ishikawas Diagram and Logic Modelling.   These models provided guidance 
for the development of the training. 
Stakeholder Analysis 
 
Trying to understanding each stakeholder’s concerns allows insight into different 
types of prevention of, mitigation of, and response to violent events. This method of 
analysis identifies shared concerns of and solutions for various shareholders. It also 
points to specific concerns unique to a stakeholder.  This process was performed by 
actually talking with patients, their family members, and other persons on the care units.  
There were discussions with administrators and hospital human resource staff to 
determine their thoughts on how violence influences their duties.  Several of those 
questioned provided similar concerns for their safety and the possible impact on patient 
care.  Some of the care providers pointed out they have to perform a balancing act with 
some patients because they know that if they curse, scream, and threaten nurse they get 
quicker service or special attention.  Care providers realize how unfair this is to other 
patients yet sometimes respond because they it is the easiest way to calm the situation.  
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Table 3.1: Evaluation Stakeholders and Related Concerns 
 
Stakeholders Concerns 
Patient Care Providers Personal injury, fear of injury, anxiety due to 
aggression and abuse 
Patients Reduced patient care staff, quality of care 
issues, legal issues 
Patient Families Quality of care issues, legal issues, lack of 
patient care staff 
Hospital administrators Regulatory concerns of staff protection, duty to 
provide a safe workplace, quality of care impact 
and reduced patient care staff or fearful staff, 
reputation of hospital, increased costs due to 
turnover and rising job position costs 
Patient Care providers families Anxiety about family members being harmed 
Hospital patient care recruiters Increases difficulty in recruitment and increases 
need for more recruitment as a result of 
retirement or moving staff 
Hospital security departments Responding to and protecting patient care 
increases need yet also increases fear of injury 
to security staff 
Insurance companies Costs of injuries to staff and others, increased 
hospitalization time costs 
Media High interest stories attract media attention and 
harm hospital reputations, media maybe 
manipulated to cover dramatic but not proven 
events 
General society Fear, anxiety, violence destabilizes public 
comfort level and reduces quality of life for all 
persons, loss of respect for patients and patient 
care providers 
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Ishikawas Diagram of Hospital Violence 
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Figure 3.3:  Ishikawas Diagram    
Logic Model   
Logic Models are used to understand how programs function.  They help identify 
inputs, activities, and outcomes. Based on research, interviews, group discussions, and 
data analysis, the researcher developed the following logic model.  The logic model is on 
the following page. 
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Table 3.2: Logic Model to Examine Violence on a Patient Care Unit 
 
Inputs Activities Outputs Short Term 
Outcomes 
Long Term 
Outcomes 
Patient care 
staff 
exposed 
Continued 
funding for 
staff, 
facility, 
supplies, 
education, 
and 
equipment 
 
Review of 
environment to 
eliminate 
possible 
weapons 
Provide 
visibility to for 
observation of 
violence  
Develop rapid 
response team  
Sufficient 
staffing for 
response to 
anticipated 
threats  
Provide de-
escalation/self-
defense 
training 
Monitor and 
document all 
violent events 
Number of 
reported 
patient events 
Number of 
injuries to 
staff 
Number of 
repeat visits to 
one patient  
Number of de-
escalation and 
self -defense 
classes held 
for patient 
care staff 
Number of 
education / 
prevention 
activities and 
number of 
participants 
Possible 
reduction in 
stress of 
patient care 
staff when 
patients act 
out   
Possible 
reduction in 
number of 
reported 
patient events  
Possible 
reduction in 
need for 
security to 
respond for 
assistance  
 
Possible reduction in 
lost work time due to 
patient care staff 
injury    
Possible reduction in 
security and patient 
care staff time 
responding to 
disruptive behavior   
Possible improved 
attitudes towards 
patient care staff to 
patients  
Possible improvement 
in staff morale. 
Possible reduction in 
overall violence, 
disrespect, and 
disruptive actions  
Possible reduction in 
turnover 
  
This study combines “quasi-experimental design” utilizing two experimental and 
averaging of six comparison units, historical and concurrent data comparisons with 
several quality improvement processes to understand violence on patient care units.   
Department Participation Process 
 
Based on frequency of reported events from 2005 to 2009, units were presented to 
Patient Care Leadership for inclusion as experimental or comparison units. Patient Care 
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Leadership was advised to exclude any unit with anticipated changes in leadership, 
location, patient types served, or staffing ratios.  
Patient Care Leadership recommended two units for participation and six for 
comparison.  The six comparison units were averaged to reduce the possibility that an 
outlier would skew the data.  All 140-hospital units’ data was averaged as a baseline. 
After Patient Care Leadership recommended a unit, the nurse manager of that unit 
could refuse participation for operational reasons.  Both invited managers chose to 
participate.  They agreed to schedule the de-escalation and self-defense training during 
normal staff meetings and keep track of participation.  No individual staff member was 
interviewed, selected, or volunteered for this study.  The two experimental units were 
treated the same as all other units after the training.  The unit staffs are similar in 
background, education, income, and working environment.  Many cultures, races, and 
religions are represented on each unit.  The units selected for the experimental de-
escalation and self-defense training was the Eldercare Unit and the Cardiac Unit.  
Data Collection Process 
 
  There were no changes in the data collection process at TGH during the study.  
The data collection process begins when a care staff member calls for security assistance.  
The care provider calls a central code line and reports the code.  The operator announces 
a Code Gray overhead and the security dispatcher announces it over security radios.  
Three to five security staff members respond to the scene.  Care managers and leadership 
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may also respond to a Code Gray.  Security completes the report and passes it to security 
leadership for review and appropriate actions.   
Data is collected using a Code Gray critique form. The same Code Gray critique 
form has been used for the past ten years by security.  It gathers information, which is 
used to track and trend for quality improvement, excluding names of patients or staff 
involved.     
The data collected on these forms includes: 
• What was the time the code was called and security arrived--security is 
held to a two minute response time anywhere within the almost 1.7 million 
square feet of the facility 
• Did security hear the overhead announcement —for improved 
communication to security staff 
• Were proper restraints available —if restraints are not quickly available, 
additional officers are needed to hold down a patient  
• Was Tampa Police assistance requested—this tracks the number of times 
such an event goes beyond the ability of a security officer 
• Did unit staff take a leadership role—to track their knowledge of 
recommended patient control techniques 
• Did security officers wash their hands—to sustain infection prevention 
To control for confounding variables, no additional training was provided to 
security officers and no changes were made to their response expectations.  They were 
not informed that the Eldercare or Cardiac Units were participating in this study.  
 56 
 
Security did not increase surveillance or perform any other duties on these units that were 
not performed prior to this study.   
Code Gray Data Collection Tool 
 
The Code Gray Critique form is designed to provide security leadership with 
information needed to determine training effectiveness and improve systems for 
responding to and reporting of aggression, abuse, or violence.  Each quantitative data 
question on the form is assigned 9 percentage points if a “yes” is indicated, and no points 
when “no” is checked.  Leadership totals these points to determine pass or fail and assign 
follow-up.  Sixty-five percent or above is passing, meaning that four “no” answers 
constitutes a failed response.  This system determines a level of performance expectation 
of patient care providers, building systems, and security officers.  Each failed responses 
results in counseling of those responsible.  Please see Appendix A. 
Code Gray Investigation Procedures 
 
The security supervisor and manager review these reports. If the quantitative 
score is low, or if something is out of the ordinary in the opinion of the supervisor or 
manager, it is brought to the attention of the director.  All events that result in an injury 
are investigated.  Since it is the security officer responding who writes these reports, 
further investigation begins with that officer.  Events are tracked and trended.  Discovery 
of any commonalities is reported to the Security Subcommittee of the Environment of 
Care Committee for follow-up.  The event reports allow Security to determine how many 
events occur on each shift, day, week, month, and unit.  They often provide knowledge 
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that is used to determine where card access, panic buttons, or cameras are needed to 
protect staff.   
The research project added one new step in the review of event reports.  This was 
the research advisory group, which was formed to determine if any adverse events 
occurred because of this research.   
Intervention Design 
 
The intervention was designed utilizing four basic theories.  Riches’ Violence 
theory provided the basis for perception and sensitivity training. It also demonstrated the 
impact on all persons involved in rather than just those directly impacted by the event.  
Albert Bandura’s Social Learning theory provided the reason to require 85% 
participation.  This number was chosen to provide a good chance that there will always 
be trained care providers for modelling of desired behaviour.  John Dollard’s Frustration 
Aggression theory pointed out situational awareness and awareness of actions of patients 
and visitors that could indicate growing anger.  Recognition of both provides the 
caregiver with an opportunity for de-escalation before a situation becomes violent.   
Training is divided into three parts.  These parts intertwine both logic and emotion 
to impact the differing personalities of care providers.  The first part of the presentation 
appeals to empathy by participants.  It explores the possible reasons that a patient or 
visitor becomes aggressive, abusive or violent, discussing fears, anxieties, and worries of 
patients and visitors.  Information about how different cultures and religions traditionally 
respond to grief is explained.  Family dynamics and stressors to be aware of are 
examined.    Actual events on their unit, or well-known events from other units, are used 
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so that they can identify with such situations.   Material is presented such that care 
providers accept they might do the same thing in a similar situation.   
Discussion continues regarding how everyone is influenced in a situation by their 
own perceptions, emotions and fears. Examples are provided of care providers whose 
actions escalated rather than calmed a situation.  This part of the presentation is designed 
to move perspective from personal to situational, thereby removing or reducing what is 
commonly known as the “fight or flight” reflex.  When the context of an event changes to 
situational, it is easier for a care provider to stay composed and objective about it.  In 
contrast, when an event is considered personal, often unintended and undesirable 
behaviours emerge, such as bullying or grandstanding.  (Stewart and Strathean, 2002)   
Support systems for patient care staff are explained.  This portion ends with how 
listening, respecting, providing information, and showing empathy  without putting 
oneself at risk can reduce or prevent escalation.    
In the second portion of the presentation, de-escalation techniques provide a 
prescriptive method of response.  These techniques can be reasonably trusted to provide 
outcomes which maintain self respect and status of the care provider while seeking to 
calm and meet the needs of the patient or visitor.  The acronym "HEAT" is used to 
remind the care giver:  Hear the person out without interruption, show Empathy, 
Apologize for anything inappropriate (without agreeing with any statements), and Take 
some action.  Since the care provider may not be able to provide what the patient or 
visitor wants, they are taught how to refuse politely and provide realistic options.  They 
then allow the patient or visitor to make the choice.  Care providers are encouraged to 
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make a modest gesture to reinforce that they care, such as bringing a blanket, pillow, or 
soft drink to the visitor or patient.    
The third portion of the intervention is hands-on self-defence.  During this 
portion, the atmosphere is kept “light” and non-threatening.  Stated goals are self-
protection, escape and assistance.  No offensive or aggressive actions, such as hitting or 
kicking, are demonstrated.   Individual respect and dignity must be protected in 
techniques presented.  Therefore, techniques to stun, shock, facilitate release, block, and 
escape are demonstrated and practiced.   
The effectiveness of this portion of the presentation relies on active participation 
by every attendee, and trust and respect of the presenter.  One technique for earning trust 
quickly is for the facilitator to identify the largest, strongest member of the group and 
volunteer that person to pretend to be the perpetrator.  This shows the participants the 
facilitator’s confidence in the techniques and adds credibility to the presentation.  
Participants have to believe that they can, with practice, perform the technique, and it will 
work if they are attacked by a larger and stronger adversary.  The facilitator may need to 
employ humour to reduce tension and allow participants to accept personal errors.  The 
presentation is normally noisy, with many people talking and practicing at the same time.  
There should be challenges to techniques and questions from participants.  Both physical 
and verbal understanding should be solicited by the presenter.  During the physical 
activities, the presenter must carefully monitor the energy levels and attitudes of the 
participants.  No one should be allowed to act dangerously or angrily during the practice. 
The facilitator must listen to feedback from the participants as well as monitor their non-
verbal cues to prevent injuries.   
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The presentation ends by providing care providers an understanding of how to 
direct security responders during such events.  Code words and methods security use are 
explained.   Understanding that security is normally at an event in less than two minutes, 
and that three to five officers are required to respond, is reassuring.  Care providers must 
believe that security will subdue the violent person and calm the situation quickly and 
quietly. 
Internal Controls for Validity  
 
Numbers of actual requests for assistance were compared with historical and 
concurrent data.  Actual care provider turnover and patient satisfaction scores were 
analyzed.  The following threats to internal validity were recognized, and efforts made to 
control them: 
• Construct variation – participants understanding the presentation differently 
Mitigation plan: 
− Asking for feedback during and after the presentation to demonstrate desired 
understanding and allow for better refinement of information. 
− Using much of the emergency department and charge nurse training material, this 
has proven over time to be clear and understandable.  This training material has 
also proven to be linguistically and culturally acceptable to the care providers.  
− Performed training with a power point format to maintain as much uniformity as 
possible in the presentations. 
• Reactivity – participants may respond differently based on the way the speaker 
presents (body language, tone etc...).   
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Mitigation plan: 
− The same researcher performed all the interventions 
− The same terminology, examples, and demonstrations were used in each session 
• Seeking Approval of Authority– participants may agree with the speaker to gain 
favored status.   
Mitigation plan:  
-  After the presentation, the presenter did not visit the intervention units or discuss 
the intervention with any member of those units until final data collection.   
- The researcher responded to codes on all units the same.  
• Selection Bias – the researcher could choose participants who are favorable to the 
research.  Mitigation plan:  
 Patient Care Leadership performed selection of units for participation in 
training.  They were given information on units with the largest number of events 
for the past five years and trends.  The Emergency Department and Mental Health 
Unit were excluded from the list because of their marked differences from other 
patient care units.  The Cardiac Care Unit had historically been in the top five 
units requesting security assistance.  The Eldercare Unit had just made the top six 
lists for the past two years. 
Statistical Methodology 
 
 Once the experimental and comparison groups had been determined, methods to 
compare these units before the training were established.  There were 12 samples for the 
experimental units and low numbers of events, so a non-parametric comparison was 
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utilized.  Kruskall-Wallis provided the following data for the comparison and 
experimental units.  This data does not show any change over time.   
Table3.3: Kruskall-Wallis Comparison 
 
Units Median Range 
Comparison (n=72) 3 0-14 
Cardiac Care (n=12) 2.5 1-7 
Eldercare (n=12) 3.5 0-10 
 
This table indicated there was similarity before the training for the comparison and 
experimental units.  Scatter plots and line graphs were developed to visualize the spread 
and trending.  These same methods were utilized after the year of monitoring was 
completed.  In addition, performing Wilcoxon Signed Ranks determined differences 
within groups.  Changes in the rate of events over time Regression modeling was utilized 
to determine if there was an increasing or decreasing trend, and the statistical significance 
of any such trend.  The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used for all 
statistical analysis.  
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Chapter 4:  Results 
 
The study was designed to investigate the impact of de-escalation and self-
defense training for care providers on reducing occupational violence.  It compared and 
contrasted two units where de-escalation and self-defense training was performed with 
their historical trends, six similar units, and the hospital overall average.  The six similar 
units acted as comparison units.  The hospital overall average was used to determine 
events that might affect the entire study.  The eight units selected as experimental and 
comparison were determined by totaling reports from 2005 to 2009 for all hospital units.  
These eight units excluded the psychiatric and emergency departments, as they are 
dissimilar to other units. 
Code Gray Baseline Data  
Table 4.1: Baseline Data from Event Reports 
 
      Code Grays from 2005 to 2010 1695 
Possible reporting units 140 
Average annual total Code Grays for the hospital 282.5 
Average annual Code Grays per unit from 2005 to 2010 5.46 
Number of units reporting Code Grays every year 16 
Total Code Grays of 16 departments reporting annually  
Percentage of every year group to total 
1350 
80 % 
Average Code Grays per 16 annual reporting units 84.38 
Number of units reporting Code Grays from 2005 to 2010 
                                                      Units reporting in 2005 
                                                      Units reporting in 2006 
                                                      Units reporting in 2007 
                                                      Units reporting in 2008 
                                                      Units reporting in 2009 
                                                      Units reporting in 2010 
54 
30 
26 
30 
42 
34 
35 
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Sixteen units comprised 80% of the Code Grays; they were from trauma, 
intensive care, psychiatric and emergency departments.  The highest number of Code 
Grays on one unit was 268.  
Table 4.2: Baseline Data for Participating Units 
 
The Cardiac Unit experienced 169 Code Grays and Eldercare 129 from January 
2005 to July 2010. The average annual Code Grays for the Cardiac Unit was 28.17, and 
for Eldercare was 21.50. The Eldercare unit changed from a normal med surge unit to 
Eldercare in 2008.  
Statistics Adjusted for Patient Days 
 
 Before proceeding to data analysis, the researcher investigated whether any 
differences in the numbers of Code Grays were due to the numbers of patients served.  
The figure below demonstrates that there was an increase in Code Grays per patient over 
time for the entire hospital.  
 Experimental 
Units 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Annual 
Average Total 
5A-Cardiac 23.0 24.0 26.0 23.0 27.0 46.0 28.2 169 
6C-Elderly 8.0 11.0 9.0 18.0 44.0 39.0 21.5 129 
Comparison 
Units 
        5C 10.0 21.0 20.0 18.0 17.0 17.0 17.2 103 
5K NA NA NA 5.0 32.0 38.0 25.0 76 
6A 48.0 22.0 57.0 62.0 44.0 35.0 44.7 268 
8C 10.0 27.0 27.0 25.0 54.0 61.0 34.0 204 
8F 6.0 7.0 8.0 14.0 23.0 41.0 16.5 99 
9A 43.0 22.0 41.0 53.0 38.0 48.0 40.8 245 
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Figure 4.1: Baseline Code Grays per Patient Comparisons 
The following Table and Figures demonstrate that, even when adjusted for patient days, 
the data remains stable.  
Table 4.3: Overall Rate Statistics –Codes per Patient Days on Units 
 
n-months of data Before After Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks 
Paired t-
test 
Comparison Units 
(n=72) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.684  0.437 
Cardiac Unit (n=12) 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.875 0.565 
Eldercare Unit (n=12) 0.006 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.050  0.026 
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  Figure 4.2: Patient Day Rate Comparisons 
  
These units are at 90 to 100 % capacity at all times. This comparison indicated the  
appropriateness of using actual data numbers for the remainder of the analysis. 
Histogram Monthly Results 
 
Monthly, the data was collected, reviewed, plotted, and placed on a line graph for 
visualization.  The results are explained in the following: a histogram of monthly 
C
om
parison U
nits 
C
ardiac U
nit 
Eldercare U
nit 
Intervention 
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averages, scatter plots, line graphs, Wilcoxon box plots, and comparison tables of 
Regression Analysis.   
The first figure is the histogram.  The hospital average takes the total number of 
events, including both comparison and experimental units, and divides this by the 140 
possible units where Code Grays could occur.   
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Before and After Averages  
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This visualization demonstrates that the average number of Code Grays per hospital 
department fell; the comparison units remained stable, the Cardiac Care unit increased 
and the Eldercare unit had a decrease.   
Next, the monthly number of events was divided by the number of patients and 
placed on scatter plots.  The trend lines were the first indication of changes before and 
after.  
 
Figure 4.4:  Scatter Plot 1: Comparison Units—trend line remains stable 
 
Figure 4.5:  Scatter Plot 2:  Cardiac—slight increase maybe due to outliers 
 
Training 
Training 
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Figure 4.6:  Scatter Plot 3:  Eldercare—decrease steady after intervention  
Line Graphs were developed to visualize monthly changes in the number of 
events.  Trend lines were added for comparison with the scatter plot trends and include 
the entire 24 months of the study.    
 
 
Figure 4.7:  Line Graph of Comparison Units Averages 
The comparison units are increasing slightly during the year before and after the training.   
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Figure 4.8: Line Graph of Experimental Units Averages   
 
 
Figure 4.9:  Line Graph of Eldercare Unit 
This Trendline demonstrates a decline.  Events from June 2010 stay below the four 
events per month and smooth out around two.  
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Figure 4.10:  Cardiac Unit Trendline 
 When the major increases occurred on the Cardiac Unit, an investigation was 
performed to determine if something had happened that would threaten safety of care 
providers on that unit.  A meeting was held with the Unit Manager.  It was discovered 
that many in the meeting had not attended the training.  When the group was asked why 
the number had increased, they did not realize they had increased.  Those who had 
attended the training had attempted to explain the process to those who did not it seems to 
have increased awareness, without providing the tools for intervention and this could 
have caused the increase.  This type of increased sensitivity has been reported in other 
studies.   
Similar Results to First Six Months of Cardiac Unit 
 
 Arnetz & Arnetz in 2000 performed a study with somewhat similar results to the 
Cardiac Care Unit.  Their hypothesis stated that a group that attended a controlled, 
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practical intervention program would report better awareness of risks, improved handling 
of aggressive situations and less exposure to violent incidents.  Their results did indicate 
improved risk awareness and better knowledge of how to handle violence compared with 
a baseline.  There was an increase in reported events, similar to the Cardiac unit of this 
study. The Arnetz & Arnetz study indicated the increased reports were a result of 
increased awareness and attention paid to those making reports.  This is very possibly the 
same reason for the increased number of reports on the Cardiac unit.  While there seemed 
to be an increase of awareness on the Cardiac unit, the care providers did not receive any 
increased attention from security or administration.  The data was utilized for the 
remainder of the study with this taken into consideration.   
At the completion of the 12 months of data collection, a new Kruskall-Wallis 
chart was prepared to compare with the “before” training data.   
Table 4.4 Second Kruskall-Wallis Chart 
 
Units Median Range 
Comparison (n=72) 2 0-12 
Cardiac Care (n=12) 2.5 0-11 
Eldercare (n=12) 2 0-4 
 
 
Table 4.5 Combined Before and After Kruskall-Wallis Tables 
 
Units Before  After P-value 
 Median  Range  Median Range  
Comparison 3.0 0-14  2.0 0-12 0.720 
Cardiac 2.5 1-7  2.5 0-11 0.651 
Eldercare 3.5 0-10  2.0 0-4 0.028 
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This comparison indicated the possibility of a significant reduction in the 
Eldercare Unit.  Further analysis was performed to clarify this indication.   
Wilcoxon Before and After  
 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks was chosen to show the differences between the 
comparison and experimental units because it makes no assumptions of the underlying 
statistical distribution and is non-parametric.  The star and circle indicate extreme and 
abnormal outliers removed from the data for comparison. 
There is little change in the hospital average; it stays close to “0”.  The Cardiac 
 
Figure 4.11:  Overall Hospital vs. Experimental Units  
 
 
 
Cardiac Care Eldercare 
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The Cardiac unit is showing a general trend towards decrease, but two 
measurements that showed a dramatic increase are pulling the distribution in the upwards 
direction.  The Eldercare Unit is mostly below the line and shows the clearest pattern of 
change. 
 
 
Figure 4.12:  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test Before and After for Cardiac 
 Non-parametric paired (pre-post testing) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, p=0.651 
(NS).  There appears to be no change on the Cardiac Unit. 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Before and After for Eldercare 
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The non-parametric paired (pre-post testing) Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, p=0.028 (SIG) 
indicates a change for the Eldercare Unit. 
 P-Scores for Wilcoxon Signed Ranks   
Comparison Group (median, range) 
Before:  3 (0-14) 
After:  2 (0-12) 
Test: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks 
P=0.720 
----------------------------------------------- 
Cardiac  (median, range) 
Before: 2.5 (1-7) 
After: 2.5 (0-11) 
Test: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks 
P=0.651 
---------------------------------------------- 
Eldercare  (median, range) 
Before: 3.5 (0-10) 
After: 2 (0-4) 
Test: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks 
P=0.028 
Table 4.6: Pre-Post Change Comparison (median, range) 
 
Control 5A p-value 6C p-value 
0 (-14 to 10) -1 (-4 to 9) 0.969 -2.5 (-7 to 3) 0.061 
 
Regression Analysis 
 
There were several steps in the Regression Analysis.  Model 1 combines 24 months of 
data to view overall change.  Model 2 compares the trend line slopes before and after the 
training. Model 3 uses the comparison units as reference for changes in the experimental 
units.
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Model 1 
 
This model combines the data to determine if an overall change has occurred 
during the twenty-four months.   
a.  Assumes a Poisson distribution for outcomes 
b. Codes are the dependent variable 
c. Time is the independent variable, 1 to 24 months. 
Table 4.7:  Overall Change 24 Months 
 
Parameter Beta 95% Confidence 
Interval (CI) 
p-value 
Intercept 1.220 1.06-1.38 <0.001 
Time -0.004 -0.02 to 0.007 0.491  
Omnibus test, p=0.491 
The beta is -0.004, indicating almost zero change during the study.  
Model 2 
 
 This model compares the slope of the events the first twelve months with the 
slope of the events for the second twelve months.  This required the use of “spline 
modeling” which allowed for the creation of two dummy variables.   
a.   One model was created for each of the units. 
b.   Independent variables were Codes Grays before the training, utilizing a 
dummy variable of zero for codes after the training (Time_Before), and Code 
Grays after the training, utilizing a dummy variable of zero for codes before the 
training (Time_After). 
c.  The dependent variable was codes.   
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Three tables are presented: Comparison Units, Cardiac Care and Eldercare  
Table 4.8:  Comparison Units 
 
Parameter Beta 95% CI p-value 
Intercept 0.970 0.77-1.17 <0.001 
Time_Before 0.037 0.009-0.066 0.010 
Time_After 0.028 -0.001 -0.057 0.060 
 
Table 4.9:  Cardiac Care Unit 
 
Parameter Beta 95% CI p-value 
Intercept 1.291 0.821 - 1.762 <0.001 
Time_Before -0.026 -0.099 -0.048 0.497 
Time_After -0.031 -0.106 – 0.044 0.415 
 
Table 4.10:  Eldercare Unit 
 
Parameter Beta 95% CI p-value 
Intercept 1.216 0.734 – 1.699 <0.001 
Time_Before 0.027 -0.041 – 0.094 0.436 
Time_After -0.083 -0.171 – 0.005 0.065 
 
When the year before the training is compared to the year after the training for each 
individual unit, no statistically significant changes are observed. 
Model 3 
 
This model compares the experimental groups with the comparison group. 
1.  Independent Variables: 
a. Group (Comparison=reference, Cardiac Unit and Eldercare Unit) 
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b. Time_ Before, Time_After 
c. Interaction Term:  Group*Time_Before, Group*Time_After (for slope 
comparison over time for the units’ data) 
 2.   Dependent variables: Code Grays  
Table 4.11:  Final Regression Statistics 
 
Parameter Beta 95% CI P-value 
Intercept 0.970 0.768 – 1.172 <0.001 
Time_Before 0.037 0.009 – 0.066 0.010 
Time_After 0.08 -0.001 – 0.057 0.060 
Group=Comparison REF REF REF 
Group=Eldercare 0.246 -0.277 – 0.769 0.356 
Group=Cardiac Care 0.321 -0.277 – 0.833  0.219 
Interaction=Comparison 
*Time_Before 
REF REF REF 
Interaction=Eldercare   
*Time_Before 
-.0.11 -0.084 – 0.062 0.774 
Interaction=Cardiac 
*Time_Before 
-0.063 -0.142 – 0.016 0.118 
Interaction=Comparison 
*Time_After 
REF REF REF 
Interaction=Eldercare 
*Time_After 
-0.111 -0.204 - 0.018 0.019 
Interaction=Cardiac 
*Time_After 
-0.059 0.139 – 0.021 0.15 
 
 Lines 7 to 9 above indicate there are no significant differences between the 
comparison units and the experimental units.  Lines 10 to 12 indicate that, compared to 
the comparison units, Eldercare is exhibiting a statistically significant decrease.  The 
Cardiac Unit also shows a decrease, but fails to reach statistical significance.  
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Final Statistical Model: 
Y (Code Grays) = 0.970 (intercept) + 0.037 (Time_Before) + 0.028 (Time_After) + 0.246 
(Eldercare) + 0.321 (Cardiac Unit) - 0.011 (Eldercare*Time_Before) – 0 .063 (Cardiac 
Care*Time_After) – 0.111 (Eldercare*Time_After) – 0.059 (Cardiac*Time_After)  
Physical and Verbal Comparisons  
 
 The percentage of physical to verbal events changed after de-escalation and self-
defense training.  The control group maintained the same percentage of physical to verbal 
events.  In the experimental group, percentages of verbal events increased and physical 
events decreased.  
 
Figure 4.14: Comparison Unit Verbal vs. Physical Percentages 
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Figure 4.15:  Experimental Unit Verbal vs. Physical Percentages 
 
Conclusions 
 
• Total Code Grays for TGH continued to increase during the 24 month 
period of this study.  The rate of increase slowed. 
• Monthly averages for the total hospital increased slightly. 
• Monthly averages for comparison units remained approximately the same. 
• Monthly averages for the Cardiac care unit increased by 1.5 codes per 
month, however the trend was negative. 
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• Monthly averages for the Eldercare unit decreased by 2.5, and continued 
to decline.   
• Wilcoxon indicated no significant change occurred on the Cardiac Unit, at 
p=0.651. 
•  Wilcoxon indicated that changes on the Eldercare unit were significant, at 
p=0.028. 
• The first Poisson Regression Analysis compared overall change and did 
not report significance. 
• The second Regression Analysis compared reports before the training to 
reports after the training on each study unit. The results failed to reach 
statistical significance.  
• The third Regression Analysis set the Comparison Units as the reference.  
The comparison with the Cardiac Unit failed to find a statistically 
significant difference.  The comparison with the Eldercare unit indicated a 
statistically significant p-value of 0.019. 
• The Eldercare Unit had nearly 50% fewer total Code Grays the year after 
the de-escalation and self-defense training.   
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Chapter 5:  Conclusions 
 The results of this study support the principle that de-escalation and self-defense 
can reduce the number of times patient care units requested security assistance with 
disruptive patients.  There was no indication that events were occurring and not reported.  
Reporting may have actually increased due to increased staff awareness.  The increase in 
verbal and decrease in physical events after the intervention suggests that care providers 
may have been more successful in preventing physical violence.  The divergent results 
from the two experimental units indicate the need for stronger controls on participation 
rates.   
Strengths and Weaknesses of this Study 
The strengths are primarily related to the ability of this study to be repeated.   
• Security staff remained blinded during the duration of the study 
• Meetings where care providers voiced strong concern for increasing aggression, 
abuse, and violence on patient care units led to the study 
• The use of existing hospital systems and staff creates simplicity 
• Existing hospital departments can plan, implement and collect data for a study 
• No overtime cost for participation, no call in pay required, and training during 
routine staffing maintains existing hospital operations and budgets 
• Actual event reports are not subjective to memory or participant bias 
• Data collected prior to training allows historical comparison 
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• Utilizing the entire hospital as part of the study provided data on stability of 
baseline 
• Staffing ratios, patient types, locations, operating policies and procedures and 
leadership were held stable during this study  
The weaknesses are due to the necessity of assumptions and the difference of the research 
hospital to other hospitals.  
 
• Care providers may have participated in other types of de-escalation and self-
defense classes during the study 
• External variables that could influence the study such as economic crisis, media 
reports of violence, political or regulatory changes were unable to be controlled 
during the study. 
• Unique size and location of TGH causes difficulty to generalize to other hospitals    
• No valid general baseline data or historical studies of violence in hospitals exist 
for comparison 
• Assumptions  
o Care providers understood to call a Code Gray when they felt threatened 
and needed security assistance   
o Care providers continued to report events as they had historically   
o Event reports were a valid  substitute for the actual number of events 
occurring on care units    
Recommendations for Future Research  
• Include variables such as care providers’ job satisfaction, unit turnover rates, and 
patient satisfaction before and after training  
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• Present same training to new staff before they begin working on the unit  
• Improving the research design may include separating the types of incidents.  The 
Royal College of Nursing, London, has recommended events be categorized as 
follows for research purposes: 
o Swearing/bad language 
o Being slapped/hit/punched 
o Being spat at  
o Abuse of a specially racial nature 
o Having hair pulled 
o Being bitten 
o Sexual harassment or advances 
o Being threatened or intimidated in any way 
o Being physically taken hold of 
o Facing threats of self-harm from the aggressor from non-
compliance with demands 
o Being pushed/shoved/grabbed 
o Being kicked (Zarola, Leather, Barklamb, 2008) 
o The barrier to the acquisition and accumulation of such data would 
be the time it takes the security person to determine and document 
relevant details ( Zarola, Leather, & Barklamb, 2008) 
• Develop standardized term and event definitions, training programs and 
presentations for several hospitals 
• Conduct similar experiments at different size hospitals  
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• Develop acceptable cost benefit analysis criteria and perform before and 
after research 
Reasons for More Research 
 
The consequences of hospital violence committed by patients and visitors harms 
care providers and may hinder their ability to provide quality care. (Henderson, 2003) 
The public, care providers and hospital administrators generally do not understand the 
frequency or severity of patient and visitor violence. Increased research is needed to 
provide policy and decision makers with valid information about issues, situations and 
types of interventions that might contribute to prevention of violence.  Increased research 
is needed to inform the public of the impacts of such violence and to promote political 
changes for the protection of patient care providers.   
If research does not lead to improved working conditions for care providers, 
regulatory agencies may become involved. The current trend for regulatory agencies is 
results-oriented, as opposed to prescriptive.  Such regulations emphasize rates as end 
products, rather than methods by which to achieve rate reductions.   Consequently, 
hospitals that invest in cost-effective interventions before regulatory involvement may 
find themselves ahead of their competitors in ways that can be both measured and 
publicized.     
In addition, labor unions use safety as a reason to gain a foothold in hospital.  National 
unions have worked with federal agencies to document the need for hospital actions to protect 
care providers from patient and visitor violence. (McPhaul, Lipscomb, 2004) Hospital 
administrators can promote research into patient and visitor violence if they wish to help prevent 
unions from using it as a campaign issue.       
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 The American Nurses Association reports that the estimated average cost of each 
physical assault is approximately $13,197.  The increasing incidence trend is further 
raising the cost of healthcare.  (Grice, 2005)  In the end, as is the case with most public 
health measures, it may be far less expensive and more effective to prevent assaults on 
health care providers rather than to react to and manage their consequences.   
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Appendix A 
Names of Response Team:__________  __________  __________  __________  
__________  __________ 
Tampa General Hospital “Code Gray” Critique 
Date____________ Time of code____________ Arrival Time ____________ 
Recall ____________ Bldg ____________ Floor/Unit____________ 
System Quantitative Data
Could the announcement be heard?         ____  9% ____  ____________ 
                       Yes  No             Comments 
Was proper restraints/equipment available?  ____ 9% ____  ____________ 
Was Security notified?   ____ 9% ____  ____________ 
Employee Training 
Was 7777 dialed?    ____    9% ____  ____________ 
Were there any injuries to personnel or to the patient? 
      ____    9% ____  ____________ 
Was TPD intervention required?  ____    9%       ____  ____________ 
Did staff provide TEAM leadership?  ____    9%      ____  ____________ 
Did Safety/Security respond?   ____ 9% ____  __________ 
Response Team 
Did any fixed post security respond?  ____   9% ____  __________ 
Did Nursing Administrator respond?  ____   9% ____  __________ 
Did all officers wash hands before and after the code? 
      ____   9% ____  __________ 
Brief narrative of the situation  
________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
If arrival time to code is more than 2 minutes, please give an explanation on back.   
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
Dispatcher___________________ Manager____________________________ 
Quantitative Score______________________ 
 
